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"DISCONTENTED BLUES": JAZZ
ARRANGEMENTS AND THE CASE FOR
IMPROVEMENTS IN COPYRIGHT LAW
John R. Zoesch II
"I think there are only three things that America will be known for two
thousand years from now: the Constitution, jazz music, and baseball, the
three most beautifully designed things this country ever produced."'
Two things listed above-the Constitution and jazz-might be
distinctively American, but one needs help from the other. While jazz
arranging "'is alive and well"' as a creative art,2 this sentiment might not
hold true regarding its status under current copyright law, as jazz
arrangements have grown increasingly complex and creative Copyright
law must ascertain a better method to afford protection to jazz
arrangements, 4 as the Copyright Clause of the Constitution mandates the
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their encouragement and support. The author would also like to thank Professor George
P. Smith, III for sharing his extensive knowledge and advice and for taking an interest in
this work. Additionally, the author would like to thank Paul Alvarez for his enthusiasm,
dedication of time, and guidance throughout this process. And finally, the author would
like to thank Fred Sturm for his insight on this topic and for helping the author learn jazz
so many years ago.
1. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO JAZZ 3 (Bill Kirchner ed., 2000) (quoting Gerald
Early, author and cultural historian).
2. John McDonough, The Lost Art of Arranging, DOWN BEAT, Jan. 1996, at 24, 25
(quoting jazz composer, arranger, and historian Bill Kirchner); see also Doug Ramsey, Big
Bands and Jazz Composing and Arranging After World War H, in THE OXFORD
COMPANION TO JAZZ, supra note 1, at 403, 417 ("Without question, the big band is alive.
It is unlikely ever again to dominate popular music, but its future as a medium for serious
artistic effort seems assured."). Though some worry that arranging might be "a lost art,"
one stalwart wholeheartedly disagrees: "It couldn't be a lost art," says Gerry Mulligan,
"not when you've got the kind of practitioners you do today who know the big band
inside-out and are teaching other generations behind them. There's some great writing
going on." McDonough, supra, at 25.
3. See infra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
4. The term "jazz arrangement" has several meanings. Note, Jazz Has Got
Copyright Law and That Ain't Good, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1940, 1954 (2005). It can refer to
improvised performances in which jazz musicians use an existing song as a "jumping-off
point[] for their own spontaneous compositions, borrowing the harmonic skeleton and
parts of the melody from the underlying [work]." Id. at 1942. This Comment will focus on
the narrower type of "jazz arrangement," which is a "written-down, fixed, often printed
and published version of a composition, usually for one of the various standard jazz
ensembles (jazz orchestra, big band, small group, etc.)." Gunther Schuller, Arrangement,
GROVE MUSIC ONLINE, § 1, http://www.grovemusic.com/shared/views/article.html?
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promotion of creativity!
One can trace jazz arrangements back to the 1920s, not by chance
coinciding with the so-called birth of jazz in the United States.6 The
earliest arrangements varied in the size of group and often were less
formal than current versions The "swing" era of the 1930s and 1940s
ushered in a new and popular style of American music that relied on big
bands.8 Though the "big band" or swing era provided an opportunity for
arrangers to showcase their works in front of mass audiences on a regular
basis, it had musical drawbacks as well. 9 The big band era's eventual
section=jazz.015900 (last visited Apr. 11, 2006); see also Note, supra, at 1954. But even
formal, written jazz arrangements usually contain sections written solely for the purpose of
improvisation. See, e.g., FRED STURM, CHANGES OVER TIME 167-204 (1995) (containing
samples of arrangements with specified sections for solo improvisers). For a look at jazz
improvisation and the copyright issues it presents, see generally Jonathan Z. King, The
Anatomy of a Jazz Recording: Copyrighting America's Classical Music, 40 COPYRIGHT L.
SYMP. (ASCAP) 277 (1997); Note, supra; and Stephen R. Wilson, Rewarding Creativity:
Transformative Use in the Jazz Idiom, U. Pirr. J. TECH. L. & POL'Y, Fall 2003, at 1, 1,
http://tlp.law.pitt.edu/articles/Vol6Wilson.pdf.
5. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power... [t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts .....
6. See STURM, supra note 4, at 8.
7. See Schuller, supra note 4, § 2. King Oliver and Sam Morgan were pioneers of
jazz bands in the 1920s. Id. Many bands played in the "dixie" style, where the entire
group would engage in simultaneous improvisation. Id. More formalized arrangements
developed in groups led by Don Redman, Jelly Roll Morton, and the legendary Duke
Ellington, in which works took more elaborate orchestrations and placed a greater
reliance on written music. See id. Groups varied in size and types of instruments as well.
See id.
8. See id. § 3. Benny Goodman, Fletcher Henderson, Count Basie, and Duke
Ellington were some of the most notable of the many arrangers of this era. Id. During
this period, the foremost utilized setting was the jazz orchestra, featuring roughly fifteen
musicians. Id. Many bands focused primarily on dance music (Goodman and
Henderson), but some allowed more freedom and featured soloists (Basie, Ellington, and
Sy Oliver). See id. During the big-band era, "the arranger became pre-eminent in jazz.
As one who developed concepts, set the style, and inspired the musicians." Id. "[T]he
arrangement took on an importance far beyond the composition." Id.; see also Joel L.
Friedman, Comment, Copyright and the Musical Arrangement: An Analysis of the Law
and Problems Pertaining to This Specialized Form of Derivative Work, 7 PEPP. L. REV.
125, 126-27 (1979) (accounting for the importance of arranging music in the big band era
as necessary "to help the public distinguish one band from another, thus contributing to its
commercial success").
9. See McDonough, supra note 2, at 24 (stating that the mass appeal of big band
music pressured the adoption of "obligatory formulas" to maintain popularity, which
eventually lessened the creative nature of the music). The pressure for mass appeal
increased the focus on the large bands and dancing arrangements led to arrangements that
were "increasingly formulaic," undermining "the essential spontaneity of jazz." Schuller,
supra note 4, § 3. As such, the arrangements needed crafting that particularly suited the
dance-oriented audience and therefore focused less on creative elements than the
[Vol. 55:867
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demise led to the birth of a more open-ended and artistically-driven
environment in which jazz arrangers write more according to their
creative instincts than a set formula.10
Since the swing era, jazz arranging has grown increasingly creative as
arrangers more often craft works according to their own desires and
experiment so as to nurture their musical curiosities." Elaborate musical
techniques have evolved, resulting in new methods to synthesize
steadfast rhythms people desired in dance music. See John H. Merryman, Copyright Law
and the Modern Dance Arrangement, 23 NOTRE DAME LAW. 481, 482 (1948). Merryman
writes:
[I]t is necessary for the arranger to so employ the song as to provide a continuous
piece of music of three to five minutes playing time. To accomplish this the
arranger will include two and a half to four choruses of the song in his
arrangement. To avoid monotony and to take advantage of the resources of the
orchestra, he will probably present these different choruses in different ways and
with different instruments carrying the lead .... Modulations will be necessary to
pass from one key to another; a beginning (introduction) and an ending will be
provided. In writing for the orchestra, the arranger will not adhere strictly to the
melody and phrasing of the original song, but will employ rhythmic and melodic
alterations to suit his purpose. In all these respects there is room for originality
and musical skill on the part of the arranger. In altering or adding to the original
song, he becomes a composer in his own right, and it is for the protection of these
contributions that he is awarded the copyright.
Id.
10. McDonough, supra note 2, at 24-28 (examining how diminishing market pressures
have enhanced creative efforts); see also Schuller, supra note 4, § 1 ("Such arrangements
range from strictly practical versions, designed primarily to serve commercial interests and
wider professional dissemination -as in the 'stock arrangements' of the 1930s and 1940s-
to highly creative recompositions .... "). One can certainly distinguish between "purely
practical" arrangements and those which involve more imagination on part of the
arranger. Malcolm Boyd, Arrangement, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE, § 1, http://www.grove
music.com/shared/views/article.html?section=music.01332 (last visited Apr. 11, 2006). As
legendary composer and arranger Gil Evans describes, "[a] singer would want an
arrangement that would sound OK with five men or fifteen men, so I would write some
stock arrangement type things for singers. Not the greatest work by any means, but ... 
BEN SIDRAN, TALKING JAZZ 19 (Expanded ed., 1995) (second alteration in original).
11. See Boyd, supra note 10, § 1 ("Arrangements by creative musicians ... often
serve to illuminate the musical personality of the composer-arranger .. "). Bill Holman,
the 1998 Down Beat International Critics Poll "Top Arranger" winner, provides insight on
how many modern jazz arrangers craft their works: "'If you want to make an arrangement
sound like [jazz legend Thelonious] Monk, you can use things he played .... But it's a
much different thing to write a piece that sounds like me, using his music."' Zan Stewart,
Arranger: Bill Holman, DowN BEAT, Aug. 1998, at 68, 68-69. Arrangers can also craft
works to reflect a particular musician's style. See SIDRAN, supra note 10, at 20 (describing
Gil Evans's work on the album Miles Ahead as a collection of "'seamless' [arrangements
that] were almost a translation of Miles [Davis's] 'sound' into orchestral terms"). Or they
can write to an individual's strengths. See id. (discussing how "Duke Ellington would
write for an individual, as opposed to just bringing different people to his notes").
2006]
Catholic University Law Review
12 1
expression. For example, jazz arrangers can alter the melody,"
reharmonize,' or even change the entire rhythmic model of a work, 5 any
of which can dramatically redirect the movement of a work. 16 In writing
highly creative arrangements, jazz arrangers adapt original works into
revitalizations of existing tunes,'7 sometimes creating works that sound
entirely new.18 Arguably, the more creative form of jazz arrangement
12. See, e.g., STURM, supra note 4, at 207-09. Arrangers have developed extensive
harmonic techniques, such as chromatic planing ("a form of exact parallelism that occurs
in concerted voicings when the lower voices move in the same direction and exactly the
same interval as the lead voice"), close position voicing ("vertical structures with tight
intervallic spacings of 2nds, 3rds, or 4ths between voices"), substitute chords ("chords that
replace or decorate a given set of chord changes"), and synthetic harmony ("vertical
structures that cannot be identified as idiomatic jazz chords; such formations are typically
the result of strong independent voice movement"). Id. at 207, 209. They have also
embraced advanced rhythmic and time-alteration techniques, like cross rhythm ("the
coexistence of two or more rhythmic patterns or groupings") and elongation ("extending a
phrase or segment by increasing the note values or adding material to reach beyond the
normal length"). Id. at 207.
13. See id. at 15 (analyzing Jim McNeely's 1993 big band arrangement of "King
Porter Stomp," in which McNeely "successfully blurred the seams between the original
line [of one section] and his own melodic embellishment").
14. See id. at 52-53 (quoting Clare Fischer's process for writing harmony). In
describing how he wrote harmony for his 1991 arrangement, "0 Pato Takes 'A' Train,"
Fischer explains that "'I used different harmonies [than in the original work] as a basis...
• I don't approach it in the typical.., context; I rely on intuition, where my ears tell me to
go. As I go along with my harmonies, my voice leading leads me into structures that are
mine."' Id. at 52 (emphasis omitted).
15. See id. at 11 (describing how even the early jazz arrangers "emphasized rhythmic
... embellishment as [a] primary tool[] in recasting an existing composition"). In 1994,
Manny Albam wrote "Not Quite All of Me," an arrangement of Gerald Marks and
Seymour Simon's "All of Me." Id. at 9, 23. Albam "transformed the traditional ...
rhythmic feel of All of Me into a jazz waltz and expanded the harmonic rhythm" of the
original work. Id. at 23.
16. Id. at 23. Fischer emphasizes the importance of harmony to the movement of the
work, explaining that "'as one [harmony] resolves, another one is set up, so that there is
always a constant forming of tension and release at different levels in the same chord, and
that is what propels the music forward."' Id. at 53 (quoting Clare Fischer).
17. Email from Fred Sturm, Kimberly-Clark Professor of Music, Lawrence Univ., to
John R. Zoesch III (Oct. 17, 2005, 11:24:00 EST) (on file with author). Arranger Manny
Albam also provides insight about creativity in arranging:
"An arrangement is really a composition-regardless of how much of it is
decomposed or re-composed. After the opening statement of my arrangement, I
decided that I didn't have to adhere to the original anymore. I've done that all
along; going back to the 1940s, I'd get a tune-especially well-known standards-
and do something else with it. The concept of working with cells of rhythm and
melody can come from many different places."
STURM, supra note 4, at 23 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Manny Albam).
18. See STURM, supra note 4, at 15 (offering a particularly interesting example of a
"re-composition"). Sturm put together a historical case study of arrangements of older
jazz works by a group of renowned jazz arrangers. Id. at 8-9. One in particular proved
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reflects more on the new material than the underlying work itself.1 9
Most jazz arrangements develop from "lead sheets" of original works.2
Because of the abundance of "standard" jazz works in this simple format,
the jazz arranger has much freedom to embellish upon the original
work.2' But arrangers do not limit their treatments to jazz standards,
often utilizing works from such idioms as rock,22 classical,23 opera,24 and
21even movie and television themes. With such a wealth and variety of
resources from which to draw, arrangers have a seemingly limitless realm
of possibilities for new derivative creations.
Unfortunately, copyright law limits protection and incentives for
26creativity in derivative works . Under courts' current standards, several
27
problems arise. First, a "practical" arrangement, if original enough to
qualify as a derivative work, gains the same classification as a more
substantial "creative" arrangement.8 Second, skilled arrangers can
exceedingly original and distant from its underlying composition: Bob Brookmeyer's
"King Porter '94," a heavily-altered version of Jelly Roll Morton's "King Porter Stomp."
Id. at 8, 15.
19. See Schuller, supra note 4, § 1 ("[Ilt is the arranger's musical imagination and skill
in terms of, for example, harmonic invention or orchestrational resourcefulness that will
inform the final product much more than the original piece on which it is based."). So-
called "recompositions ... transform the basic material in a specific style or manner, in
itself marked by a striking originality which may even surpass the quality of the original
material." Id.
20. Lead sheets are the most "raw" form of chart, typically containing the melody
and chords to a given song. See, e.g., 2 THE NEW REAL BOOK (Chuck Sher & Bob Bauer
eds., 1991). Often times, such printed versions are short in duration. See Merryman, supra
note 9, at 482 ("The ordinary popular tune is thirty-two bars long. [This amounts to]
about one minute of playing time .... ).
21. See STURM, supra note 4, at 8. Most often, an arranger adjusts the composer's
melody and rhythmic support. Id. at 11. Other common alterations include chord
substitution, reharmonization, and altered voicings. Id. at 38. The arranger can also
adjust the form of the work and orchestrate as he sees fit, and add introductions,
interludes, and endings. See id. at 92, 130, 168-69.
22. See, e.g., GIL EVANS, GIL EVANS PLAYS HENDRIX (RCA Records 1974); see also
Mizar 5, Posting of M5 to Mizar 5 slang me!, http://www.writingaffairs.com/mizar5net/
index.php?p=66 (Feb. 21, 2005, 18:20 EST) (discussing Fred Sturm's recent project, Do It
Again, a collection of big band arrangements based on the music of Steely Dan).
23. See, e.g., VINCE MENDOZA, Pavane, on SKETCHES (ACT Publishing 1994)
(performing Maurice Ravel's "Pavane").
24. See, e.g., Bob Belden-Black Dahlia Biography, http://www.nujazzcity.com/black
dalia.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2006) (discussing Bob Belden and his arrangement of
Puccini's Opera, Turandot).
25. See, e.g., MARIA SCHNEIDER, Love Theme From Spartacus, on COMING ABOUT
(Enja Records 1996).
26. See infra Part II.B-C.
27. See supra note 10.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 169, 195.
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rework original songs so dramatically as to render the underlying work
insignificant in comparison to the arrangement. 9 Arrangers then face
the dilemma of whether to copyright the arrangement as a derivative
work and thus achieve lesser ownership, or to copyright the arrangement
as an original work and risk infringing the underlying work.3 ° Courts
must determine how to most effectively "promote the Progress of...
Arts" so as not to endanger this unique brand of creativity.3"
This Comment will examine how the judiciary has defined musical
arrangements as separately copyrightable derivative works and has
established criteria that arrangements must meet in order to receive
copyright protection. Next, this Comment will look at how courts apply
the "substantial similarity" test to distinguish between allegedly
infringing musical works. This Comment will then examine the various
levels of musical expertise courts look to in deciding whether a work
infringes the copyright of a previous musical work.
Upon evaluating the standards for arrangements and substantial
similarity, this Comment will propose more workable standards for
courts to apply when situations requiring such analyses arise. This
Comment will also evaluate and suggest a more flexible standard for
derivative works so as to accord adequate protection to jazz
arrangements. Finally, this Comment will advocate for an expert-driven
"intended audience" standard that provides a high level of particularized
musical expertise in order to assist the judiciary in assessing protection
for jazz arrangements.
I. THE JAZZ ARRANGEMENT AS A "DERIVATIVE WORK" UNDER U.S.
COPYRIGHT LAW AND OTHER ISSUES OF MUSIC COPYRIGHT LAW
One could argue that no work is truly original, and that all existing
works of art necessarily contain some elements and ideas from pre-
29. Email from Fred Sturm, Kimberly-Clark Professor of Music, Lawrence Univ., to
John R. Zoesch III (Aug. 27, 2005, 09:23:00 EST) (on file with author); see also STURM,
supra note 4, at 15, 100-02 (providing a detailed analysis of an arrangement that strays far
from its underlying composition).
30. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property
Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1022 (1997) (pointing out the difficulty that arises when the
material added by a subsequent work is "inextricably intertwined" to material taken from
an underlying work"); see also Email from Fred Sturm, supra note 17 (indicating that
composers often receive a percentage right to royalties, while arrangers typically receive
an up-front sum without royalties over the life of the arrangement's sales). The composer
of the underlying work receives a portion of royalties for every arrangement subsequently
related. See id. Thus, problems arise when it comes time to copyright an arrangement and
obtain licensing rights from the author of the original work, because a difference in
royalties exists between an arrangement and an original work. See id.
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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existing works.32 Music exemplifies this situation because only a limited
number of notes and, consequently, note combinations, exist.33 The
United States Constitution grants Congress the power "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts,"3 and, utilizing this power, Congress
protects "musical works" under the Copyright Act of 1976 (1976 Act).35
32. See Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436) ("In
truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any, things, which, in
an abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout."); see also Joseph K. Christian,
Comment, Too Much of a Good Thing? Deciphering Copyright Infringement for the
Musician, 7 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 133, 142 (2004) ("Musicians always listen to other
musicians. . . . [M]usicians are inspired by other musicians. Thus, a musician will
inevitably hear things she wants to incorporate into her own music.").
33. See Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1988) ("[W]e are mindful of
the limited number of notes and chords available to composers and the resulting fact that
common themes frequently reappear in various compositions ...."); Christian, supra note
32, at 133 ("There will inevitably be similarities between works since all music is made
from a small set of notes, limited by the range of the performer or instrument, and limited
even further by the patterns that most listeners appreciate."); Paul M. Grinvalsky,
Comment, Idea-Expression in Musical Analysis and the Role of the Intended Audience in
Music Copyright Infringement, 28 CAL. W. L. REV. 395, 396 (1992) ("Because the musical
language is limited, it is difficult to determine what portion of the language is at the
disposal of the public to use and where the permission to use it stops, the point at which
free use of the language becomes impermissible, if for no other reason than because it has
been used the same way by someone previously."). Jazz presents a unique example of this
as well, for improvisational musicians in particular borrow a from prior artists' styles and
methods. See King, supra note 4, at 278-79 ("[Wlhile all musical genres may borrow from
each other, jazz musicians seem uniquely focused on recasting and transforming standards
.... [Jazz] takes preexisting material and spontaneously superimposes on that material
new melodies, harmonies, and rhythms."). One could argue that jazz arrangements
"codify" jazz improvisation to some degree, in that their published form presents works
"fixed in [a] tangible medium." 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (describing that copyright
protection only extends to those works whose expression is "fixed in [a] tangible
medium"); see also infra note 35 (discussing the protection the Copyright Act of 1976
affords).
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
35. Copyright Act of 1976 § 101, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2000 & Supp. 2002), amended
by 17 U.S.C.A. § 102 (West Supp. 2005). The Act protects "original works of authorship"
and sets out a group of categories that receive its safeguard. Id. § 102(a). "Musical works"
fall within the classification of "original works of authorship," thereby guaranteeing
composers the right to copyright their works and defend their rights against those who
infringe their works. Id. Additionally, the Act limits protection to works "fixed in any
tangible medium of expression." Id. For example:
Suppose a person sits down at a piano and creates a new arrangement of a
popular song. This would not by itself be an infringement of the copyright,
because the person has not yet fixed the new arrangement in a tangible medium.
... [O]nce the new arrangement is fixed in a tangible medium, the reproduction
right is violated, and there is tangible evidence of the violation.
Tyler T. Ochoa, Copyright, Derivative Works and Fixation: Is Galoob a Mirage, or Does
the Form(gen) of the Alleged Derivative Work Matter?, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 991, 1024 (2004) (footnote omitted). Thus, once the arrangement is
printed or performed publicly, it falls under the Act. Id. To summarize, "[m]odern
2006]
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A copyright owner also owns rights extending from the original work,
such as the right to make "derivative works" based upon the original
work protected by copyright.36 The Act defines a derivative work as "a
work based upon one or more preexisting works ... which, as a whole,
represent[s] an original work of authorship."37  The Act allows
individuals other than the original copyright holder to create and
copyright derivative works, but implies that they must obtain consent to
do so. 3  Though authors of derivative works can obtain a copyright for
their work, the protection afforded by the Act extends only to material
original to the derivative work itself.3 9 The author of the original work
maintains the exclusive right to the original work and to its material
presence in a subsequent derivative work. 40
The 1976 Act classifies musical arrangements as a type of derivative
work.41  Courts have long recognized the right to copyright a musical
copyright law vindicates a composer's proprietary claims over a wide variety of uses of
music, including written representations of music in notation form, as part of a dramatic or
audiovisual work, and when embodied in a sound recording." Michael W. Carroll, Whose
Music Is it Anyway?: How We Came To View Musical Expression as a Form of Property,
72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1405, 1417 (2004).
36. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000 & Supp. 2002). Section 106 grants the owner of a
copyright "exclusive rights" over its use. Id. § 106. Hence, "[t]he composer's rights can be
infringed by unauthorized reproduction or distribution of written or recorded music,
creation of musical works derived from the composer's work, and, significantly, public
performance of the musical works." Carroll, supra note 35, at 1417.
37. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000 & Supp. 2002), amended by 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West Supp.
2005); see also 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
3.01, at 3-4 (2005) ("A work is not derivative unless it has substantially copied from a prior
work.").
38. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) ("[P]rotection for a work employing preexisting material in
which the copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such
material has been used unlawfully.").
39. See id. § 103(b) (limiting the copyright in a derivative work "only to the material
contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material
employed in the work"). One court described the relation between derivative and original
works: "[A] work is not derivative unless it has been substantially copied from the prior
work." Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984). As explained by
Nimmer, "a work will be considered a derivative work only if it would be considered an
infringing work if the material that it has derived from a pre-existing work had been taken
without the consent of a copyright proprietor of such pre-existing work." 1 NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 37, § 3.01, at 3-4.
40. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (stating that the copyright in a derivative work "does not imply
any exclusive right in the preexisting material"). The statute clarifies that a copyright
earned for a derivative work "is independent of, and does not affect or enlarge the scope,
duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright protection in the preexisting
material." Id.
41. Id. § 101. Section 101 provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this title,
as used in this title, the following terms and their variant forms mean the following: ... A
'derivative work' is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a ...
[Vol. 55:867
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arrangement.4 2 But unless the owner of the copyright to an original work
agrees to allow another to make an arrangement of the work, the
musical arrangement." Id. Grove Music Online's definition of arrangement, written by
Malcolm Boyd, defines an arrangement as "lt]he reworking of a musical composition,
usually for a different medium from that of the original." Boyd, supra note 10. The
American Heritage Dictionary defines a musical arrangement as: "An adaptation of a
composition for other instruments or voices or for another style of performance [or] [a]
composition so arranged." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 99 (4th ed. 2000). Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary defines
arrangement as "an adaption of a musical composition by rescoring." MERRIAM-
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 68 (11th ed. 2003).
42. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 37, § 2.05[C], at 2-56 ("Although it is clear
that musical arrangements may be the subject of copyright, in order to claim such
protection, an arrangement, like any other work, must evince originality." (footnote
omitted)). A classic example is Carte v. Evans, 27 F. 861 (C.C.D. Mass. 1886). George
Lowell Tracy obtained an agreement from William S. Gilbert and Sir Arthur Sullivan to
create a piano arrangement of their opera, The Mikado, or The Town of Titipu. Id. at 861-
62. The original score to the opera consisted of a vocal score in addition to numerous
parts for an orchestra with a variety of instruments. Id. at 862. Tracy then condensed the
score so as to read for a single piano as accompaniment to the opera's existing vocal score.
Id. The court found it "well settled" that a piano arrangement of an orchestral score
constitutes an "original musical composition" under copyright law. See id. (stating that
while an arrangement resembles the original composition, it "acceptably requires musical
taste and skill of a high order, and a thorough knowledge of the art of musical
composition, and especially of instrumentation"). The court clarified that recognition,
however, stating that such an arrangement "would undoubtedly be a piracy of the original
• ..unless the arranger has in some way acquired the right to make such use of the
original;.., the arrangement is substantially a new and distinct composition, and as such is
entitled to the protection of the court." Id. Another example is Edmonds v. Stern, 248 F.
897 (2d Cir. 1918), which upheld protection for a copyrighted orchestral arrangement of
an operetta song, id. at 898. The court gave weight to the fact that the defendants had
acquired the rights to make an arrangement in addition to the finding that their
arrangement was "'substantially a new and distinct composition."' Id. at 898 (quoting
Carte, 27 F. at 862). The arrangement, "wholly separate and independent" from the
original copyrighted song, deserved "'the protection of the court."' Id. (quoting Carte, 27
F. at 862). And in Baron v. Leo Feist, Inc., 173 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1949), the Second Circuit
found that a piano transcription and arrangement of an original song, "L'Annee Passee,"
was copyrightable and protected from an infringing song that utilized its "melody,
uninterrupted sequence of identical notes, rhythm, construction, harmony, identity of
unusual dissonant chords, and other respects, [proving] so great as to preclude the
inference of coincidence," id. at 290. See also Plymouth Music Co. v. Magnus Organ
Corp., 456 F. Supp. 676, 677, 679-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (upholding plaintiff's versions of
Christmas songs, specifically adapted for Magnus chord organs). But see Shaw v. Time-
Life Records, 341 N.E.2d 817, 820 (N.Y. 1975) ("Although musical compositions can be
afforded copyright protection, arrangements made of those compositions are not
copyrightable. Absent a claim of unfair competition, a competitor may appropriate any
musical arrangement which is not so distinctive as to constitute a separate musical entity."
(citing Supreme Records, Inc. v. Decca Records, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 904, 908-09 (S.D. Cal.
1950)).
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copyright owner retains the sole privilege to make an arrangement and to
protect their rights in the arrangement against infringing works. 3
A. The Requirement of Originality: A Required Threshold To Cross in
Order To Qualify for Copyright Protection as a Musical Arrangement
To be the subject of copyright, a work must evince originality."
Musical arrangements are no exception, as they also must possessS 41
sufficient originality to qualify for copyright protection. Courts'
standards, however, vary as to the requisite level of originality necessary
to copyright a musical arrangement. 46
1. Substantially New and Original as Distinguishable from the Original
41Involving a dispute over a polka arrangement, Jollie v. Jaques sheds
light on the early judicial basis for the copyrighting of musical
43. See Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Foullon, 79 F. Supp. 664, 665-66 (S.D.N.Y.
1948) ("There is no doubt that the copyright owner of a musical composition has a right to
make a version and arrangement."), affd, 171 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1949). In addition, Section
106 of the Copyright Act of 1976 also authorizes the owner of a copyright "to prepare
derivative works based upon the copyrighted work." 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000 & Supp.
2002).
44. See 17 U.S.C § 102(a) (2000) ("Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with
this title, in original works of authorship .... (emphasis added)); Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) ("To qualify for copyright protection, a
work must be original to the author. Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only
that the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other
works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity." (citation
omitted)). "Originality is a constitutional requirement," id. at 346, which "is the very
'premise of copyright law,"' id. at 347 (quoting Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650
F.2d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1981); see also 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 37, § 2.01 [A], at
2-9 ("Originality in the copyright sense means only that the work owes its origin to the
author, i.e., is independently created, and not copied from other works."); Grinvalsky,
supra note 33, at 399 ("In music copyright infringement cases, the concept of originality is
intimately tied to the copying aspect of copyright infringement."); Note, Originality, 115
HARV. L. REV. 1988, 1988, 1997 (2002) (claiming that "[l]awyers know that originality is
the touchstone of copyright law" and that "copyright aims to encourage 'original' works of
authorship").
45. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 37, § 2.05[C] ("[T]here appears to be a
tendency to require a somewhat greater degree of originality in order to accord copyright
in a musical arrangement.").
46. Friedman, supra note 8, at 132. Friedman writes that:
courts are far from consistent in their approach to this particular form of
derivative work. Some courts have subjected the musical arrangement to
excessive scrutiny and have set extremely high originality standards .... Other
decisions reflect a complete disdain for weighing any creative effort, resulting in
copyright protection for the most minimal amount of additional material.
Id. (footnote omitted).
47. 13 F. Cas. 910 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1850) (No. 7,437).
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arrangements.48 Here, the plaintiff adapted a German public domain
composition for use as the musical basis for a comedy called The Serious
Family.49 The plaintiff accused the defendants' arrangement of infringing
the plaintiff's original work arrangement.0 The defendants, however,
denied that their version copied the plaintiff's work and instead argued
that their version constituted an independently created adaptation.5'
Moreover, the defendants contended that the plaintiff's arrangement did
12not possess the requisite originality to deserve copyright protection.
Agreeing with the defendants, the court denied an injunction and held
that although copyrights protect a composition "of a new air or melody,"
such a work must be "substantially a new and original work; and not a
copy of a piece already produced, with additions and variations, which a
writer of music with experience and skill might readily make."53
The court in Cooper v. James4 followed a line of reasoning similar to
the Jollie court when it denied copyright protection to an arrangement
that added only an alto part to an existing three-part harmony songbook
entitled The Sacred Harp.55 Holding that the additional alto part did not,
by itself, create a "'substantially new and original work,"' the court
reasoned that "mere improvements" to known works cannot provide a
claim to "any special rights whatever.
5 6
48. Id. at 911.
49. Id. at 913. The public domain work, entitled The Roschen Polka, served as the
basis for plaintiff's arrangement, and the plaintiff admitted as much. Id. at 913-14.
50. Id. at 913.
51. Id. The defendants titled their arrangement "The Serious Family Polka." Id.
52. See id. at 913-14 (arguing that "The Serious Family Polka" was a "substantial
copy" of the original German composition and that the plaintiff's changes equaled those
that "any person of ordinary skill and experience in music could have made").
53. Id. Distinguishing between a copy of a previous version (the public domain work
in this case) and a copyrightable arrangement, the court clarified that an arrangement with
sufficient originality to be copyrightable "requires genius for its construction," while an
arrangement that sounds "substantially the same as the old," (the work of "a mere
mechanic in music") does not deserve protection. Id. at 913. The court added that "there
may be great difficulty in distinguishing between those new compositions that do, and
those that do not absorb the merit of the original work." Id. at 914. Given that each case
has unique circumstances, the court also established that "[p]ersons of skill and experience
in the art" are needed to determine issues of infringement. Id. Joel Friedman finds the
Jollie standard to be "an incredibly strict standard," that if followed, would create a
situation in which "no arrangement could ever be copyrighted." Friedman, supra note 8,
at 133.
54. 213 F. 871 (N.D. Ga. 1914).
55. Id. at 872-73. The plaintiff left the songbook's three parts (soprano, tenor, and
bass) substantially unchanged. Id. at 872.
56. Id. at 873. The court also stated that "anything which a fairly good musician can
make, the same old tune being preserved, could not be the subject of a copyright." Id. at
872; see also Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Miracle Record Co., 91 F. Supp. 473, 474 (N.D.
Ill. 1950) (involving a claim of copyright infringement due to an allegedly identical bass
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Similarly, in Norden v. Oliver Ditson Co.,57 the court refused to protect
the plaintiff's choral arrangement of a Russian hymn, "Oh Light Divine,"• • 58
due to insufficient originality. While the defendant admitted to
preparing its own arrangement from plaintiff's published adaptation, he
changed not only rhythms, but also notes and harmonies which made his
new lyrics "more singable."5 9 Holding that the plaintiff's arrangement
did not contain substantial changes so as to make it distinguishable from
the original, the court found that to be the subject of a copyright, a new
version must possess more than "minor changes which any skilled
musician might make."6 Accordingly, the plaintiff lacked standing to
bring a copyright claim.61
62Supreme Records, Inc. v. Decca Records, Inc. involved arrangements
of the same song by both the plaintiff and defendant. 63 The complaint
line). In Shapiro, the trebles of the two works differed, so logically the plaintiff's claim
rested on the similarities of the bass section. Id. The court found, however, that the bass
line was "too simple" and no more than "a mechanical application of a simple harmonious
chord"; therefore, it lacked sufficient originality to deserve copyright protection. Id. at
474. The court further explained that "the purpose of the copyright law is to protect
creation, not mechanical skill." Id. at 475. Consequently, it denied the plaintiff's claim of
infringement. Id.
57. 13 F. Supp. 415 (D. Mass. 1935).
58. Id. at 416, 418. The arrangement consisted of English text translated from
Russian, which required rhythmical changes due to a change in the number of syllables.
Id. at 416. The plaintiff, however, did not change the harmony or pitches of the original
Russian work. Id.
59. Id. at 416-17.
60. Id. at 418. The court also found that plaintiff's version "remained the same old
tune." Id. What is significant about this holding is that the defendant had never seen the
original Russian composition, but created its own version (with an entirely different set of
lyrics) from the plaintiff's work exclusively. Id. at 416-17. A more recent decision
evidenced a similar standard for originality. See ZZ Top v. Chrysler Corp., 54 F. Supp. 2d
983, 985 (W.D. Wash. 1999). In ZZ Top, the plaintiffs asserted that Chrysler used part of
their song as background music for a promotional video for the introduction of a car. Id.
at 984-85. In defense, Chrysler challenged the originality of plaintiffs' work, and, hence,
the validity of its copyright. Id. at 985. For valid copyright registration, the court stated
that a work "'need not be new, but only original."' Id. (quoting Sid & Marty Krofft
Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163 n.5 (9th Cir. 1977)). The
court held that the defendant failed to prove that ZZ Top's guitar riff from the song "La
Grange" was unoriginal; stating that the riff "'contributed something more than a merely
trivial variation, something recognizably [its] own,' to the common idea of a guitar riff."
Id. at 986 (alteration in original) (quoting Sid & Marty Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1163 n.5). More
specifically, the court rejected the defendant's attempt to demonstrate the substantial
similarity between the riff in "La Grange" and a separate work by Norman Greenbaum
titled "Spirit in the Sky," which also contained a somewhat similar riff. Id.
61. Norden, 13 F. Supp. at 418.
62. 90 F. Supp. 904 (S.D. Cal. 1950).
63. Id. at 905. Plaintiff Supreme Records owned the master recording of Paula
Watson's orchestration of the song "A Little Bird Told Me." Id. Black & White Records,
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alleged that the defendant's arrangement misappropriated the plaintiffs'
property rights because the defendant's arrangement was "similar to, and
an imitation of," the plaintiffs' version. 64 The court recognized that for a
musical arrangement to receive protection against infringement, it must
be distinct from the original composition such that "any person hearing it
played would become aware of the distinctiveness of the arrangement.
65
Applying this standard, the court found that the plaintiff's arrangement,
which added an introduction, handclapping, choral responses, and some
filler music, did not rise to the requisite level of creativity to warrant
66
protection.
2. Minor Variations. "Modicum" vs. "De Minimus"
Plymouth Music Co. v. Magnus Organ Co. 67 focused on the plaintiff's
book of Christmas songs, arranged specifically for the Magnus chord
68
organ. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs did not hold valid
copyrights to the disputed works because the works were only
arrangements of works already in the public domain.6  Mostly
disagreeing with the defendants, the court found that three-quarters of
the arrangements contained enough originality to hold valid copyrights. 0
also a plaintiff, held distribution rights to the recording. Id. Both plaintiffs were
concerned with Decca's production of records with an allegedly infringing arrangement.
Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 908 (emphasis omitted). The court also noted that, "in order that a
particular arrangement be given recognition as such, the elements ...introduced must
involve creative ability of a distinct kind." Id. at 913. Note that the lawsuit involved a
claim for unfair competition as opposed to copyright infringement. Id. at 906. The court
later expanded upon the requirements for separate recognition, notably that the work
seeking protection "must consist of unique elements which combine to produce a finished
product which has a being or distinctive existence of its own." Id. at 909 (emphasis
omitted).
66. Id. at 911, 913 ("Adding certain incidents, such as emphasis upon accent ... does
nothing to the essence of musical creation."). The court saw these additions as "elements.
.well known in the art" and held that their use did not give rise to a claim of originality,
but instead constituted changes "which would occur to any arranger." Id. at 911.
Additionally, an introduction to a piece accompanied by orchestra garnered no extra
support, as "very few recordings begin with the mere singing of the song." Id.
67. 456 F. Supp. 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
68. Id. at 677-78. Defendant Magnus Organ most likely initiated the reason for the
controversy. The plaintiff Plymouth Music Co. originally licensed the defendant Magnus
Organ Co. "to publish, print, distribute and sell" the book. Id. at 678. Magnus Organ
ended its relationship with Plymouth and went on to sell the books under an agreement
with another defendant, Charles Hansen Music. Id. Of the fifteen songs in the book, the
plaintiffs claimed infringement of their rights for twelve songs. Id.
69. Id. at 679.
70. Id. at 680. Of the twelve songs in dispute, the court found that nine held valid
copyrights so as to warrant the plaintiff's claim of infringement. Id.
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The court based this decision upon finding that the arrangements
"contained 'at least a modicum of creative work,' sufficient to uphold the
plaintiffs' copyrights.",
71
In contrast, in McIntyre v. Double-A Music Corp. ,72 the plaintiff added
an introduction, additional bars of harmony, theme repetitions, and an
ending to the existing song, "Tonight You Belong to Me., 73 The court
rejected the plaintiff's argument that the arrangement deserved• 74
copyright protection. Finding the melodic and harmonic
embellishments inconsequential and relying on expert testimony that the
added introduction "was as commonplace among musicians as the fairy
story beginning," the court found that such a "de minimus contribution[]
[does] not qualify for copyright protection." 75
3. Woods v. Bourne Co.: Some Guidelines for Originality
A more recent case that discussed the requirement of originality in
musical arrangements is Woods v. Bourne Co. 76  At issue was Irving
Berlin's piano-vocal arrangement of Harry Woods's song, "When the
Red, Red Robin Comes Bob, Bob, Bobbin' Along., 77  The Second
71. Id. (quoting Consol. Music Publishers, Inc. v. Ashley Publ'ns, Inc., 197 F. Supp.
17, 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)). Consolidated Music Publishers involved a plaintiff who sought to
protect its copyrighted compilation of public domain piano music. Consol. Music
Publishers, 197 F. Supp. at 17. The court examined whether the addition of editorial
matter such as fingering, phrasing, and expression markings provided sufficient originality.
Id. Finding that the defendant's work effectively copied the plaintiffs, the court held that
plaintiff's work contained "'at least a modicum of creative work,"' and, therefore, met the
burden of originality amounting to "a little more than a mere trivial variation." Id. at 18
(quoting Andrews v. Guenther Publ'g Co., 60 F.2d 555, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1932)). One
commentator notes that "there would have been little or no audible difference if the
additional matter had been omitted altogether" since the added markings "would
probably not have affected the 'sound' of the work." Friedman, supra note 8, at 135. The
1976 Act also protects compilations. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
72. 166 F. Supp. 681 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
73. Id. at 683.
74. Id. The plaintiff based his claim for recovery upon the theories of common-law
copyright and unfair competition. Id. at 682. While rejecting both claims, the court also
added that plaintiff's composition would fail to qualify for a statutory copyright. Id. at
683.
75. Id. at 683. The court described the plaintiff's additions as "[s]uch technical
improvisations which are in the common vocabulary of music and which are made every
day by singers and other performers." Id.; see also Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 435 n.2
(9th Cir. 1986) ("[A] taking is considered de minimus only if it is so meager and
fragmentary that the average audience would not recognize the appropriation.").
76. 60 F.3d 978, 981 (2d Cir. 1995).
77. Id. at 981-82. Woods wrote the song in 1926, originally in lead sheet form, and
the same year, entered into a Songwriter's Agreement with Irving Berlin's publishing
company. Id. at 981. As part of the agreement, Woods transferred to Berlin the original
song in addition to "'the right to make, publish and perform any arrangement or
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Circuit adopted the district court's formulation of the originality standard
and utilized it for purposes of analyzing the case at hand.78 The district
court stated the following originality standards for derivative works:
In order therefore to qualify as a musically "derivative work,"
there must be present more than mere cocktail pianist
variations of the piece that are standard fare in the music trade
by any competent musician. There must be such things as
unusual vocal treatment, additional lyrics of consequence,
unusual altered harmonies, novel sequential uses of themes-
something of substance added making the piece to some extent
a new work with the old song embedded in it but from which
the new has developed. It is not merely a stylized version of the
original song where a major artist may take liberties with the
lyrics or the tempo, the listener hearing basically the original
tune. It is, in short, the addition of such new material as would
entitle the creator to a copyright on the new material.79
The court determined that the original piano-vocal version registered
by Irving Berlin with the copyright office did not constitute a derivative
work.8°  As such, the court found that any "independent creation
distinguishing the lead sheet from the piano-vocal arrangement was
attributable to Woods before he sold the Song to Berlin. 8 ' Factually,
expert testimony established that any variations in the piano-vocal
version were "insubstantial." '  The court concluded that Berlin's
arrangement was effectively Woods's original composition before Berlin
received rights to the work.83 This finding proved significant because
Bourne's contention rested on the premise that Berlin's version
adaptation of the same."' Id. at 981-82 (quoting the songwriter's agreement). Berlin later
published a piano-vocal arrangement of the song and obtained a copyright that named
Woods as the author of the words and music, but listed no one else as the arranger. Id. at
982. Berlin made subsequent arrangements of the song, as did Bourne, the defendant,
who had succeeded Berlin to rights in the copyright. Id. at 981, 983.
78. Id. at 991.
79. Woods v. Bourne Co., 841 F. Supp. 118,121 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (footnotes omitted),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 60 F.3d 978 (2d Cir. 1995).
80. See Woods, 60 F.3d at 991-92 (noting this was the case because "any original
creativity that went into producing it was the result of Wood's effort and occurred before
the rights in the composition were granted to Berlin").
81. Id. at 992. The court held that the lead sheet and piano-vocal arrangement were
two different versions of a single composition, even though they lacked literal identities.
Id. The court also gave weight to the fact that only Woods's name appeared on the
copyright as author, and the district court's finding that Berlin credited Woods with
authorship over the piano-vocal version. Id. at 991-92.
82. Id. at 992.
83. Id. at 991-92.
2006]
Catholic University Law Review
constituted a separately copyrightable arrangement. 84 If Berlin's version
had constituted a derivative work, Bourne, as Berlin's successor in
copyright, would have retained performance and royalty rights to that
85particular version.
Having decided that Berlin owned the copyright to Woods's original
composition, the court looked to Bourne's 1981 arrangement of the song
and its bass-line variation in order to determine whether it could
constitute a copyrightable derivative work.86 The Second Circuit agreed
with the district court's conclusion that the arrangement "'in no way
exhibit[ed] the degree of creativity required to make it a derivative
work."' 87 Thus, the court found that, notwithstanding the non-derivative
nature of Berlin's work, none of Bourne's arrangements rose to the level
of independently protected derivative works."' Accordingly, Bourne held
no future performance or royalty rights in its arrangements of the song.89
B. Copyright Infringement of Musical Works: The "Substantial
Similarity" Test
Courts historically have protected the rights of composers from
copyright infringement. 9O To determine infringement claims, they apply
the "substantial similarity" test.9' To determine whether musical works
are substantially similar, courts most often look to elements of the
composition. 92  Courts also examine allegedly similar portions or
segments of works to determine whether that portion gives rise to
84. Id. at 989.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 993. The Bourne arrangement differed in that it contained a "moving bass
line" as opposed the original's bass notes, which occurred on the first and third beats of
every measure. Id. While a moving bass line adds, fittingly, more movement and flow to a
work, it likely differed only in that it added "filler" notes on the second and fourth beats.
This probably changed the feel slightly, but it does not constitute a substantial change to a
work. This arrangement earned royalties for its use in a Delta Faucet commercial. Id.
87. Id. (quoting Woods v. Bourne Co., 841 F. Supp. 118, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 60 F.3d 978 (2d Cir. 1995)).
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. See infra Part I.B.1-3.
91. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 37, § 13.03[A], at 13-33 ("Just as copying is
an essential element of copyright infringement, so substantial similarity between the
plaintiff's and defendant's works is an essential element of actionable copying." (footnote
omitted)).
92. See 1 id. § 2.05[D], at 2-57 ("It has been said that a musical work consists of
rhythm, harmony and melody, and that originality, if it exists, must be found in one of
these."); infra Part I.B.1.
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infringement of an entire work.93 And some courts examine the "total
concept and feel" of a work to decide infringement claims. 94
A seminal case in music copyright infringement law is Arnstein v.
Porter.95 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant infringed his copyrights•• 96
to several musical compositions. Stating the general standards by which
to prove copyright infringement, the court required the plaintiffs to
prove: "(a) that defendant copied from plaintiff's copyrighted work and
(b) that the copying (assuming it to be proved) went so far as to
constitute improper appropriation. '" 97 After listening to the recordings of
the works in dispute, the court found sufficient similarities between the
works that, although not strong enough to warrant a conclusion of
infringement by themselves, were strong enough to warrant remanding
the case for a jury finding of fact if more evidence of infringement
existed.98
1. Courts Look to Elements of a Musical Work
a. Melody
Courts most often look to the melodies of competing works to
determine the issue of substantial similarity.9 In a famous case, former
93. See infra Part I.B.2.
94. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
95. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). One scholar described Arnstein as a "clearly
articulated copyright approach" that "remains the most instructive guide to proving
infringement." Alan Latman, "Probative Similarity" as Proof of Copying: Toward
Dispelling Some Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187, 1191 (1990).
96. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 467 (alleging that defendant infringed Arnstein's copyrights
to "The Lord is my Shepherd," "A Mother's Prayer," "La Priere," "I Love You Madly,"
and "A Modem Messiah").
97. Id. at 468. The court further stated that acceptable evidence of copying "may
consist (a) of defendant's admission that he copied or (b) of circumstantial evidence-
usually evidence of access-from which the trier of the facts may reasonably infer
copying." Id. Because admissions of copying are rare, "[i]f there is evidence of access and
similarities exist, then the trier of the facts must determine whether the similarities are
sufficient to prove copying." Id. The court then stated that expert testimony could help in
aiding a trier of fact to determine the issue of similarity. Id. Where there is no evidence of
access, "the similarities must be so striking as to preclude the possibility that plaintiff and
defendant independently arrived at the same result." Id. If copying is found, the issue
becomes that of whether it constituted "illicit copying"; the court stated that the "ordinary
lay hearer" should determine the legality of such copying. Id.
98. Id. at 469.
99. See, e.g., N. Music Corp. v. King Record Distrib. Co., 105 F. Supp. 393, 395, 397
(S.D.N.Y. 1952) (involving a copyright claim by the copyright owners of "Tonight He
Sailed Again" against numerous defendants for "I Love You, Yes I Do"). In King Record,
the court decided upon the issue of "whether the two compositions are similar." Id. at 397.
The court noted the songs' "virtually identical" rhythmic patterns, similar points of
melodic climax, similar patterns of harmony, and identical form (AABA, which is very
2006]
Catholic University Law Review
Beatle George Harrison faced a copyright infringement claim against his
song, "My Sweet Lord," in Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs
Music, Ltd.'0° The plaintiff claimed Harrison plagiarized its work, "He's
So Fiie," primarily through the "My Sweet Lord" melody's patterned
repetition of two motifs.' 1 Though the motifs were not particularly
original by themselves, the experts who testified all agreed that the
pattern of motifs in "He's So Fine" resulted in a "highly unique" work.'
2
The melody repeated "motif A," a three-note descending phrase, four
times, followed by "motif B," which was also repeated four times' 03 "My
Sweet Lord" contained an almost identical use of the same motifs,
differing only in that Harrison's work repeated motif B just three times,
as opposed to plaintiff's four.' °4 An additional similarity, the duplicative
use of a grace note at the end of the second repetition of motif B, gave
the court enough ammunition to make its finding.' 5 Almost solely due to
its melody, the court found it "clear" that Harrison's song was the "very
same song," declaring ultimately that it infringed "He's So Fine."' '°
common among popular compositions). Id. Most importantly, however, the court found
that the similarities in those passages "comprise[d] a significant and continuous portion of
the melodies of both songs." Id. Setting the standard for piracy at whether "the whole
meritorious part of the song is incorporated in another song, without any material
alteration in the sequence of bars," the court found infringement based primarily upon
"substantial melodic similarity." Id. at 397-98. It also noted that within one strain of eight
bars, the two melodies had sixteen notes in common, but more importantly noting that the
similarity was not just in the number of similar notes, but how similar the songs sounded to
the judge's "untrained ear" while played simultaneously. Id.
Similarly, in Hein v. Harris, 175 F. 875 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910), the plaintiff sought an
injunction to prevent infringement of the copyright to "The Arab Love Song," specifically
asserting that the defendant imitated the melody of his chorus, id. at 875. Judge Learned
Hand analyzed all seventeen measures in each work, noting that both were written in the
same time and in minor key, and brushed off the fact that the songs differed in key
because a transposition would yield "an almost exact reproduction" of the original
melody. Id. at 876. He found the first five bars "alike, almost note for note;" a "striking
similarity" in bars eight and nine; and duplications in bars ten through twelve. Id. All in
all, Judge Hand found that thirteen of the seventeen bars were "substantially the same in
each song." Id. Due to the high degree of similarity, Judge Hand found that the
defendant's work infringed plaintiff's song. Id.
100. 420 F. Supp. 177, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
101. Id. A "motif" is a short musical phrase. See id.
102. Id. at 178 & n.3.
103. Id. at 178. The notes were adjusted rhythmically so as to fit the words of the
melody. See id.
104. Id. The court also took into account the similarities between the harmonies of
each work. Id.
105. See id. at 178 n.5 ("This grace note ... has a substantial significance in assessing
the claims of the parties hereto.").
106. Id. at 181. The court classified the two as "virtually identical except for one
phrase" and different words. Id. at 180. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this case




Although harmony by itself generally does not receive copyright
protection,'07 Tempo Music Inc. v. Famous Music Corp.'°8 indicated that
harmony might suffice.1 9 Duke Ellington's estate, namely his son Mercer
and the Famous Music Corporation, sued the executor of Billy
Strayhorn's estate claiming that Strayhorn did not have a protected
interest in his harmonic contributions to subsequent arrangements of
"Satin Doll," a song by Ellington."0 The court narrowed the issue to
whether Strayhorn's estate could assert a right to the harmony and
revised melody of two such arrangements "when used or performed
without the lyrics.""'.
Examining the issue of harmony, Judge Sand acknowledged harmony
as inherently derivative because it usually accompanies an already-
created melody."2  Rejecting the Ellington Estate's argument that
harmony cannot itself give rise to a copyright, the court held that,
although certain chords occur inevitably from a given melody,
composers-especially in jazz and contemporary music-sometimes
make especially creative use of harmony, which necessarily "influences
the mood, feel and sound of a piece.""' 3
utilization of the "He's So Fine" theme, the obvious similarity of the two works indicated
that the particular combination of notes he used arose from his subconscious recollection
of The Chiffons' popular tune. Id. The court did not believe that Harrison intentionally
copied the work, but instead assumed that he "knew" the music would ring popular with
listeners because of this subconscious realization of the previous tune. Id.
107. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 37, § 2.05[D], at 2-57 ("[C]ourts have
hesitated to find the necessary originality in harmony, and it has been suggested that
harmony cannot in itself be the subject of copyright." (footnote omitted)); see also N.
Music Corp. v. King Record Distrib. Co., 105 F. Supp. 393, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1952)
(suggesting that because harmony has been "in the public domain for so long," it can not
"in itself be the subject of copyright").
108. 838 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
109. Id. at 169; see also Wihtol v. Wells, 231 F.2d 550, 554 (7th Cir. 1956) (finding that
"the writing of the other three parts, alto, tenor and bass, was further original work" and
upholding the plaintiff's copyright for that material).
110. Tempo Music, 838 F. Supp. at 164.
111. Id. Because Strayhorn wrote the lyrics to "Satin Doll," no question existed as to
whether his estate had an interest in the song when performed with the lyrics. See id. at
164 n.2. The court later dismissed the revised melody as insufficient for copyright
protection because it contained only a one note variation and was therefore insubstantial
in terms of originality. Id. at 167 n.7.
112. Id. at 167. Relying upon the notion that a copyrightable derivative work must
consist of nontrivial original aspects and that the protection afforded the derivative work
draws from its reliance on the previous work, the judge found that the only protected
interests the "Satin Doll" derivative works would be those aspects new to the
arrangements. Id. at 168.
113. Id. at 168 (internal quotation marks omitted).
20061
Catholic University Law Review
Instead of relying on the proposal of novel results as the standard for
originality, the court deemed the creative process as most important,
leading to its conclusion that "harmony can, as a matter of law, be the
subject of copyright... 4 The court's refusal to grant summary judgment
indicated the court's more expansive view of copyright protection.' 
1 5
2. An Extrinsic Approach: Looking to Specific Portions of a Musical
Work
In some cases, a portion of a musical work will prove important
enough so that copying (or nearly copying) it will warrant a finding of
copyright infringement.16  Plaintiffs can face a difficult burden when
claiming copyright infringement in this manner."7 Generally, if a portion
114. Id. at 168-69. The court elaborated, stating that "[t]his emphasis on creative
process rather than novel outcomes is consistent with the standard in other jurisdictions
which emphasize creative inputs beyond mere technical changes any skilled musician
could make." Id. at 169 n.11 (citing McIntyre v. Double-A Music Corp., 166 F. Supp. 681
(S.D. Cal. 1985); Norden v. Oliver Ditson Co., 13 F. Supp. 415 (D. Mass. 1936); and
Cooper v. James, 213 F. 871 (N.D. Ga. 1914)). The court also noted that, as in the case at
hand where Strayhorn added harmonies to Ellington's composition, "where the
composition of the melody is completed by one person and the harmony is thereafter
furnished by another, the harmony may be less likely to reflect originality than in those
instances in which simultaneous composition of melody and harmony is utilized to create
certain musical effects." Id. at 169.
115. See id. at 171-72. The court, however, did not rule on whether Strayhorn
deserved royalties for his work on those pieces. Id. What makes this case most applicable
is that the court recognized harmony as a protectable element of a jazz arrangement. Id.
at 167-69. While some works do not evince sufficiently originality in their harmony, the
apparent standard of Tempo Music provides a distinction depending on the creativity
inherent to a particular work. See id. at 169.
116. See, e.g., Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). Plaintiff
Fisher claimed that Jerome Kern's song "Kalua" infringed his work "Dardanella" due to
the alleged similarity of an ostinato (a repeating figure) in both the verse of Fisher's song
and in the chorus of "Kalua." Id. The conflicting portion included only eight notes within
two measures, repeated continuously. See id. at 146 (indicating that the effect of the
repeating section was to imply the sound of surf to the listener). Judge Learned Hand
noted that though a copyright covers an entire composition, "plagiarism of any substantial
component part, either in melody or accompaniment," could provide the basis for
infringement. Id. at 147. The court found infringement for the plaintiff, Fisher, holding
that not only were the figures similar, but they were also used in the same way. Id. at 147-
48; see also Johns & Johns Printing Co. v. Paull-Pioneer Music Corp., 102 F.2d 282, 283
(8th Cir. 1939) ("The chorus of a musical composition may constitute a material and
substantial part of the work and it is frequently the very part that makes it popular and
valuable.").
117. See Christian, supra note 32, at 133 (maintaining that "[wihile it is relatively easy
to detect wholesale copying of an entire work, copying of only a portion of an original
work can be rather difficult to prove").
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of one work proves to be quantitatively and qualitatively similar to
another work, it will infringe the original work.
18
Boosey v. Empire Music Co."9 focused on the alleged similarity
between plaintiff's song-about hearing the voice of a deceased loved
one-and defendant's song, which "express[ed] the desire of a negro to
go back to his old home in Tennessee.' 120  Although the only similar
phrase between the two works consisted of the phrase with the lyrics, "I
hear you calling me," the court found that this phrase contributed so
greatly to the success of both works as to warrant a finding for the
plaintiffs.12  The court rested its conclusion on the fact that such a
powerful phrase would provide the economic basis for each work's
122
success; thus justifying granting the plaintiff's motion.
Digital sampling presents a prime example of new musical works
utilizing portions of previously existing works.123 Though Newton v.
Diamond124 presents a situation where a plaintiff fell short of obtaining
copyright protection for a short segment of his music, it demonstrates a
similar standard.12 In Newton, the Ninth Circuit examined the claim that
the music group Beastie Boys infringed flutist James Newton's
copyrighted composition by utilizing a sound recording of a six-second,
three note segment of the song. 26 The defendants had obtained a license
118. Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct.
2905 (2005); see also Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1987) (indicating that
even when a specific copied portion makes up a small part of a work, the court can find
substantial similarity if that portion is of qualitative importance).
119. 224 F. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
120. Id. at 647.
121. Id.
122. Id.; see also Robertson v. Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborne, Inc., 146 F. Supp.
795, 798 (S.D. Cal. 1956) (holding the defendants liable for infringement because they
copied a portion of plaintiff's song that proved responsible for its commercial success and
popular appeal). In Robertson the plaintiff alleged infringement of his song, "The Happy
Whistler," by defendants in their recorded advertisements for Burgermeister Beer. Id. at
797-98. The court took an almost mathematical approach to find infringement, noting two
bars in defendants' works that proved identical to two of the bars in plaintiff's four-bar
"key melody." See id. at 798. To complete its finding of infringement, the court declared
that the defendant's song created an "impression on the ear of substantial similarity with
that of plaintiff's." Id.
123. See, e.g., Newton, 388 F.3d at 1190. Sampling consists of "the incorporation of
short segments of prior sound recordings into new recordings." Id. at 1192.
124. 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2905 (2005).
125. Id. at 1190, 1192-93.
126. Id. at 1190. The three-note sample consisted of the notes "C-D flat-C, sung
over a background C note played on the flute." Id. at 1191. The Beastie Boys utilized the
sample and repeated it throughout their song "Pass the Mic." Id. at 1192.
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to sample a particular sound recording of the song, but never obtained
permission to use the copyrighted composition itself.
12 7
Applying the substantial similarity test, the Ninth Circuit found that
the sampled portion did not constitute a "quantitatively or qualitatively
significant portion of the composition as a whole.', 2 8 Relying on the
Beastie Boys' expert testimony, the court decided that the three-note
section did "not represent the heart or the hook of" Newton's
composition, but instead was "'simple, minimal . .. insignificant . . .
common, trite,"' and "'lack[ed] any distinct melodic, harmonic, rhythmic
or structural elements"' and thus could not infringe the original
copyright.
29
3. An Intrinsic Approach: "Total Concept and Feel"
Some courts have applied a "total concept and feel" test to evaluate a
copyright infringement claim in which works are compared not by an
analytical framework, but rather by the songs' overall similarities."0 In
127. Id. at 1190. The court "filter[ed] out" the licensed elements of the recording to
determine whether the defendants infringed the underlying composition by itself, because
"Newton's copyright extends only to the elements that he fixed in a tangible medium-
those that he wrote on the score." Id. at 1193-94. In this sense, Newton presents a unique
sampling case, one which has more significance to the topic at hand. When dealing with
infringement claims against the use of an actual sound sample, courts have imposed more
stringent standards in allowing the use of samples of sound from copyrighted works (again,
the defendants in Newton escaped this claim because they had licensed use of the
recording). See id. The plaintiff in Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records,
780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), sought an injunction for defendants' unlicensed use of a
portion of music from plaintiff's song "Alone Again (Naturally)," id. at 183. The Grand
Upright court emphasized that the defendants knew they should have obtained a license
and that even after plaintiffs denied their license requests, they proceeded to make use of
the music. See id. at 184-85 ("[lt is clear that the defendants knew that they were
violating the plaintiff's rights as well as the rights of others."). Effectively, the ruling
established digital sampling without a license as a per se copyright violation. See id.
Additionally, a recent case in the Sixth Circuit established a bright-line rule for copyright
infringement in digital sampling, requiring a copyright license in order to sample from a
previously existing work. See Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390, 398 (6th
Cir.), amended by 401 F.3d 647 (6th Cir. 2004), amended in part by 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir.
2005).
128. Newton, 388 F.3d at 1195. The court considered the issue of "whether the
unauthorized use of the composition itself was substantial enough to sustain an
infringement claim." Id. at 1193. The court also looked to determine whether the use
amounted to something more than a de minimus use, which would not rise to the level of
substantial similarity. Id.
129. Id. at 1196 (quoting Dr. Lawrence Ferrara, defendant's expert).
130. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 37, 13.03[A][1][c], at 13-43 to 13-48. The
phrase was first stated in Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th
Cir. 1970). See also Michael L. Sharb, Comment, Getting a "Total Concept and Feel" of
Copyright Infringement, 64 U. COL. L. REV. 903, 931 (1993) (proposing a Redefined Total
Concept and Feel Test to examine copyright infringement claims). Sharb suggests a five-
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Baxter v. MCA, Inc. ,1" the "E.T." Theme came under attack. 32 Plaintiff
Leslie Baxter alleged that John Williams's work infringed his 1953
composition entitled "Joy."'33  Baxter alleged that the E.T. Theme
"largely copied" his song.'3 While the defendants argued that Baxter's
claim centered solely on a six-note sequence within the works, the court
instead viewed the case as resting on a broader examination of the
works.'35  The Ninth Circuit took up the question of whether the two
works had "substantial similarity of expression," or general ideas.'36 It
explained the test as "intrinsic"-stating that determining similarity of
expression proved "subtle and complex" -thus dismissing the suggestion
to apply a bright-line rule to the substantial similarity test. 137  In so
finding, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment, determining that "reasonable minds could differ as to whether
Joy and Theme from E.T. are substantially similar.
''3 8
step test to determine copyright infringement: First, the court determines whether the
plaintiff holds a valid copyright; second, the court determines whether the defendant
copied plaintiff's work; third, the court determines the protectability of the copied
material; fourth, the court decides whether the defendant's taking of the plaintiff's
protected expression rises to the level of improper appropriation; and finally, the court
determines substantial similarity using the intended audience test. Id. at 930. This test is
claimed to protect artists' styles and provide flexibility in assessing copyright claims, while
at the same time providing predictability. Id. at 930-31. But with so many intricacies
involved in the arrangements, and so many arrangements in existence, this solution seems
too superficial to present solidly-grounded decisions on a consistent basis. At the same
time, however, some arrangers prefer to alter the context of a work and adapt it to a
different "feel." See, e.g., STURM, supra note 4, at 35 (providing the example of "0 Pato
Takes 'a' Train," Clare Fischer's latin-style arrangement of Billy Strayhorn's "Take the
'A' Train").
131. 812 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1987).
132. Id. at 422-23.
133. Id. Baxter and Williams had known each other for many years, and Baxter
proved at trial that Williams knew the song "Joy." Id. at 422.
134. Id. at 423.
135. See id. at 425 (leaving open the possibility for the jury to make a determination
based upon the six-note sequence if it determined that the similarity was so confined).
136. Id. at 424. The appeal arose out of the district court's grant of summary judgment
to Williams's work that "as a matter of law ... there was no substantial similarity between
the two works." Id. at 423.
137. See id. at 424-25 (identifying the appropriate means by which to test similarity
expression as "the response of the ordinary reasonable person to the works").
138. Id.; see also Supreme Records, Inc. v. Decca Records, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 904, 912-13
(S.D. Cal. 1950). In Supreme Records, although the court held the plaintiff's musical
arrangement unprotected, it nonetheless analyzed the plaintiff's work against the
defendant's allegedly infringing arrangement. Id. Both songs had the same melody due to
being derived from the same original work (hence neither could claim protection), but the
court arrived at different impressions of the two works. Id. at 912. Finding the plaintiff's
work to be "mechanical," "lacking inspiration," and possessing only the usual
accompaniments and intonations, Judge Yankwich determined that defendant Decca's
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C. Who's Listening? Discerning an Appropriate Standard for Evaluating
Originality and Substantial Similarity
The finder of fact in any lawsuit can be either the judge or jury."'
Regardless of who presides in a given case, a court must determine not
only the legal standard to apply to the issue of infringement, but also a
listener standard with which to charge the finder of fact.' 4°  Courts
generally have adopted an ordinary, reasonable or lay observer standard
to determine substantial similarity of expression in copyright
infringement lawsuits, as explained in Sid & Marty Krofft Television
Products, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.14' There, the Ninth Circuit held that
"[t]he test to be applied in determining whether there is substantial
similarity in expressions shall . . . depend[] on the response of the
ordinary reasonable person. 1 42  Some courts have held otherwise,
however, instead looking to the average member of the "intended
audience.' ' 43 Also, the level of deference given to expert testimony can
vary depending on the standard applied.'4
1. The "Lay Listener" Standard
Courts sometimes apply a "lay listener" standard.14 Baxter held that
where the test of substantial similarity proves "intrinsic," without
reliance on external criteria, "'[alnalytic dissection' and expert testimony
arrangement sounded "full, meaty, [and] polished," owing its different nature to a "more
precise, complex and better organized orchestral background." Id. The judge made it
clear that he believed Decca's recording was superior and, therefore, quite dissimilar from
the plaintiff's recording, except for the similar melody. Id.
139. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 38-39 (discussing the right to a jury trial and the
implications of waiving that right-i.e., a bench trial).
140. See infra Part I.C.1-2.
141. 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977). The test apparently originated in Daly v.
Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132, 1132-34 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3,552), a case involving similar
train track rescue scenes in separate plays, id. at 1132-34. The Daly court there stated the
test as whether "the appropriated series of events . . . is recognized by the spectator,
through any of the senses to which the representation is addressed, as conveying
substantially the same impressions to, and exciting the same emotions in, the mind, in the
same sequence or order." Id. at 1138; see also Levine v. McDonald's Corp., 735 F. Supp.
92, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("[T]he substantial similarity inquiry is conducted from the
perspective of the 'ordinary observer .... '" (citing Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin
Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960)).
142. Krofft Television, 562 F.2d at 1164 (citing Int'l Luggage Registry v. Avery Prods.
Corp., 541 F.2d 830, 831 (9th Cir. 1976), and Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 18-
19 (9th Cir. 1933)).
143. See infra Part I.C.2.
144. See infra Part I.C.2.
145. See, e.g., Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 424 (9th Cir. 1987).
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are not called for; the gauge of substantial similarity is the response of
the ordinary lay hearer.'46
Other courts have promulgated a similar test in different ways. In
Decca Records, the court found that the appropriate standard for
determining infringement among different arrangements of a work
would require a judge to put himself "in the position of the average
person who would listen to the two records. 1 47 From this perspective,
the judge would determine whether listening to one piece would confuse
the average person's ability to distinguish one piece from the other.
48
Likewise, in Northern Music Corp. v. King Record Distrib. Co.,4 9 the
court tested similarity by determining "whether there is a resemblance
noticeable to the average hearer."15  Also, the court in Boosey
determined that it should evaluate the music "as the uninformed and
technically untutored public.. 5
2. "Intended Audience" Test
In Arnstein, the Second Circuit described the appropriate audience for
determining copyright infringement of a musical work as follows: "The
question, therefore, is whether defendant took from plaintiff's works so
much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the
audience for whom such popular music is composed .... Though the
court allowed expert testimony, it stated that such testimony "will in no
way be controlling on the issue of illicit copying, and should be utilized
only to assist in determining the reactions of lay auditors."'53
Many courts have read Arnstein as supporting the notion that a lay
listener always should make the decision as to whether a work infringes
another. 114 Arnstein's language, however, is narrower and only requires
146. Id. (quoting Krofft Television, 562 F.2d at 1164).
147. Supreme Records, Inc. v. Decca Records, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 904, 912 (S.D. Cal.
1950).
148. See id. (citing the difficulty in analyzing the similarity of two songs as opposed to
two pieces of literature).
149. 105 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
150. Id. at 397. The court admitted that "we rely on the only other test (aside from
expert testimony) available to a judge, who is a musical layman." Id.
151. Boosey v. Empire Music Co., 224 F. 646, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
152. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946). The court added that it
would test the issue of illicit copying by "the response of the ordinary lay hearer." Id. at
468.
153. Id. at 473.
154. See Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 734-35 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing
the "lay listener" test as "a rule that has come to be stated too broadly" and suspecting
"that courts have been slow to recognize explicitly the need" to modify that test
appropriately to incorporate the intended audience idea).
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such a lay-listener test where the intended audience of the work consists
of lay listeners.1
5
156The Fourth Circuit, in Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., seized upon
the language .in Arnstein and deemed the relevant inquiry to be that of
the "intended audience." '157 The dispute in Dawson involved William L.
Dawson's arrangement of the spiritual "Ezekiel Saw De Wheel," and
Gilbert M. Martin's alleged infringement of Dawson's version.' Having
read the relevant test of substantial similarity as necessitating
examination of the ideas in a work and the expression of such ideas, the
court stated that expert testimony should provide insight into the
similarity of two works' ideas.5 9
As for expression, the second prong of the substantial similarity test,
the Dawson court held that a court should look to the type of audience
the plaintiff intended the work to reach.'60 The intended audience might
well include lay observers, as in Arnstein, but
if the intended audience is more narrow in that it possesses
specialized expertise, relevant to the purchasing decision, that
lay people would lack, the court's inquiry should focus on
whether a member of the intended audience would find the two
works to be substantially similar. Such an inquiry may include,
and no doubt in many cases will require, admission of testimony
from members of the intended audience or, possibly, from those
who possess expertise with reference to the tastes and
161perceptions of the intended audience.
155. See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473 ("The question, therefore, is whether defendant
took from plaintiff's works so much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who
comprise the audience for whom such popular music is composed, that defendant
wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff.").
156. 905 F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1990).
157. See id. at 734 (finding that "the copyright law's purpose of protecting a creator's
market" leads to the necessary comparison by those within that market).
158. Id. at 732. William Levi Dawson, conductor of the Tuskegee Choir of Alabama's
Tuskegee Institute, was a prolific arranger of traditional spirituals. Philip C. Baxa & M.
William Krasilovsky, Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc.: The Fourth Circuit Revisits Arnstein
and the "Intended Audience" Test, 1 FORDHAM ENT. MEDIA & INTELL. PROP. L.F. 91, 91
(1991). Dawson believed strongly that his arrangements needed to encompass "'the
conditions and circumstances which gave birth to them,"' as works of inspiration. Id. at 92
(quoting K. Robert Schwartz, Composers Who Had To Triumph Over Prejudice, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 15, 1990, § 2, at 29). Dawson obtained a copyright for his arrangement of
"Ezekial Saw De Wheel" in 1942 and subsequently "sold thousands of copies of the sheet
music of his arrangement." Id. at 95.
159. See Dawson, 905 F.2d at 732-33 (stating that the first prong of the substantial
similarity test is an "extrinsic" or "objective" test).




Given the nature of the work at issue in Dawson, the court held that
the plaintiff should not be required to persuade a lay listener of the
infringement of his specialized work, especially if the lay listener
audience did not include anyone, such as choir directors, who would
purchase Dawson's arrangement.
16 1
II. INADEQUACIES IN THE CURRENT APPROACH TO ASSESSING THE
CONTRIBUTIONS OF ARRANGERS
A. Stuck on a Single Threshold Approach for Derivative Works
Courts have applied a variety of standards to determine the requisite
originality that an arrangement must possess for purposes of copyright
law. 63 Joel L. Friedman outlines several approaches courts can apply to
test originality in a musical arrangement. T6 He then proposes a
combination of these approaches, suggesting that a judge should examine
the actual material contributed and determine the material's level of
creativity from its resulting "audio impression.'
165
Another proposition is to redefine "derivative work" to mean "a work
based significantly upon one or more pre-existing works, such that it
exhibits little originality of its own or that it unduly diminishes economic
prospects of the works used."' '6 This proposal, however, sets too low of a
standard for qualifying as a "derivative work," similar to such standards
like the "modicum of creative work" standard.
167
162. See id. at 737 ("[S]piritual arrangements are purchased primarily by choral
directors who possess specialized expertise relevant to their selection of one arrangement
instead of another.").
163. See supra Part I.A.
164. See Friedman, supra note 8, at 136. He first details the "significant creativity
test," which requires a contribution to the underlying work involving "creative ability of a
distinct kind." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). This test requires the court to
examine closely the arranger's contribution and compare it to "the contributions of other
arrangers." Id. Second, he outlines the "audio test," which compares the arrangement to
the original work by way of a "listening" comparison. Id. Friedman compares this test to
Nimmer's "distinguishable variation" test. Id. If an arrangement "leaves an impression of
newness or novelty when compared to the underlying work, it will be subject to
copyright." Id.
165. See id. at 137 ("This [test] would allow the works in the Supreme and McIntyre
cases to be protected, and yet would exclude from protection the works in Consolidated
Music.").
166. Noami Abe Voegtli, Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1213, 1267
(1997). This proposed definition would make it less burdensome for jazz improvisers to
copyright their performances and recordings. See Note, supra note 4, at 1956. Because
they deviate so much from underlying works, improvised works evaluated under this
standard would qualify as separate original works, apart from an underlying work to which
they otherwise would owe rights. See id.
167. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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While these proposals appropriately attempt to shift the focus towards
additions to, rather than taking from, underlying works," 8 the proposals
fail, as do courts, to provide a framework to differentiate more
substantial derivative works from those which barely surpass the minimal
standard required.169 Arrangers who far surpass this single threshold of
originality might instead copyright their works as separate original
works, risking potential claims of copyright infringement by the
170underlying composer.
B. Copyright Law and Its Incentives for Creativity
The United States Supreme Court has stated that while the immediate
effect of copyright law is to provide monetary incentives for the creative
labors of authors, "the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate
artistic creativity for the general public good.'' Economic incentives,
112however, often drive this ultimate goal. Professor Paul Goldstein
points out the difficulty that can arise in distinguishing between
infringing works and non-infringing derivative works, and, therefore,
highlights the problem that "[tihe works at the outer reaches of this
continuum, and some intermediate works as well, will frequently bear
scant resemblance to the expression or the ideas of the seminal work and
will often be connected only by a license authorizing use of a title or
character name.', 173 Goldstein argues that "[c]opyright is made to do too
168. See Note, supra note 4, at 1956.
169. See supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 30 and accompanying text; infra note 173 and accompanying text.
171. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
172. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy behind
the clause empowering Congress to grant . . . copyrights is the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through the talents of authors ...."); Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and
Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SoC'Y 209, 216 (1983) (supporting the
view that copyright encourages original expression by the attraction of private
investment). Professor Goldstein argues that copyright attempts to further this goal by
vesting exclusive rights in owners so they can profit from future unauthorized uses of their
original works. See id. (claiming that in so doing, copyright law creates a "floor" by
allowing protection for only original works, and a "ceiling" by preventing the protection of
ideas, instead guarding only expression). Goldstein also cites derivative works
protections, specifically sections 102(a), 103, 106(1), and 106(2) of the 1976 Copyright Act.
See id. at 217. Another commentator claims that two underlying rationales exist:
economic and moral. See Sharb, supra note 130, at 906 ("The author has a natural right to
reap the benefits of his or her creation.").
173. Goldstein, supra note 172, at 217. The author also notes that "the point at which
the right 'to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies' leaves off and the right 'to prepare
derivative works based upon the copyrighted work' begins [is where] the contribution of
independent expression to an existing work effectively creates a new work for a different
market." Id. Goldstein further explains that "[t]he central problem is that all works are to
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much in resolving these cases in favor of the owners of underlying
works," giving the owners too much power over future derivative
works. 174
Others have expanded this argument, claiming that giving original
authors such strong ownership rights creates monopoly power in the
original work.'75 The greater the copyright protection for original works,
they argue, the less incentive there is for others to produce creative
works, especially derivative works. 176 One concern is that the owner of
the underlying copyright would not approve of a proposed derivative177
use. Still, others point to the importance of allowing the underlying
some extent based on works that precede them." Id. at 218. To demonstrate this point,
Goldstein continues:
Ravel's orchestration for Pictures at an Exhibition clearly derived from
Moussorgsky's Suite for Piano. But it is no less true that Moussorgsky derived
the inspiration for his work from Victor Hartmann's sketches and drawings
displayed in 1874 in the rooms of the St. Petersburg Society of Architects, and
that Hartmann's sketches and drawings derived from subjects and from
compositional, stylistic and thematic elements appearing in earlier works.
Id.
174. See id. at 222.
175. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 1197, 1204-05 (1996) ("Any copyright protection beyond that necessary to
compensate the author for lost opportunities would generate no additional incentive to
create .... "). Professor Sterk claims that "[t]o the extent that copyright protection
eliminates copiers from the market, the original author becomes a monopolist in the
market for his copies of his work." Id. at 1205.
176. See id. at 1207 ("[S]ome copyright protection is necessary to assure authors a
financial return on the time and energy devoted to creative activity .... [Giving authors
additional copyright protection will reduce the supply of new works because the number
of marginal authors deterred from creating . . . will exceed the number encouraged to
create."); see also Amy B. Cohen, When Does a Work Infringe the Derivative Works Right
of a Copyright Owner?, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 623, 657 (1999) (describing the
concern that "[giving copyright owners too much control may prevent derivative users
from being able to improve and build upon those underlying works and thus to create new
works of authorship").
177. See Bob Belden-Black Dahlia Biography, supra note 24 (providing a biography of
jazz arranger Bob Belden, with his commentary). During the early 1990s, Belden wholly
engaged himself in a massive project to recreate Puccini's famous opera, Turandot. Id.
Belden explains:
"The subject matter and melodic nature of 'Turandot' were exactly what I
wanted to deal with. It was about love, as most tragic operas are, and it was
about the quest for unrequited love and eternal love set against a social backdrop
that put obstacles in the way. Nobody had ever covered an opera before, and I
did it in such a way that I was able to transform the musicians who were involved
on the record into following the personalities of the characters in the opera."
Id. (quoting Bob Belden).
This had a profound effect on Belden's career at that point: "'The recording was
suppressed by the publisher, which put me into a terrible state of artistic depression. I felt
I could not express myself any more than that record at that time. I stopped writing
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author sufficient interest in subsequent uses.178 Copyright law must strive
to strike an appropriate balance between authors of original works and
those who improve upon those original works by creating derivative
works.179
C. "Improvements" in Copyright Law
Professor Mark A. Lemley is among those who suggest that copyright
laws do not provide sufficient incentives for the creation of derivative
works, for if unlicensed, the authors of the derivative work hold no rights
in their improvements if the derivative work is found to infringe.180
Lemley points out that copyright law affords different levels of
protection to improvements through the law's derivative works right; and
defines three applicable groups of improvers in copyright law: minor
improvers, significant improvers, and radical improvers. 8'
Minor improvers "advance[] social utility by adding to the basic
[work], but who do[] not contribute enough to justify receiving
music."' Id. (quoting Bob Belden). The project abruptly came to an end in the United
States, however, when the publisher and Puccini's estate blocked the production of
Belden's tremendous undertaking. Id.; Don Williamson, Black Dahlia, ALLABOUTJAZZ.
COM, http://www.allaboutjazz.com/reviews/r0401_002.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2006).
Given that Belden's work would likely influence an entirely different market than
Puccini's opera, one could argue that halting the release of such a large-scale work hardly
advances creativity in the arts. See, e.g., Bob Belden-Black Dahlia Biography, supra note
24.
178. See William M. Landes & Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 83, 91-92 (Donald A. Wittman ed., 2003)
(claiming that giving the author of a derivative work too much power would cause the
original author to delay publication, thus inhibiting incentives for creating works-and
suggesting that "giving the original author a monopoly of derivative works [would] reduce
transactional costs"); see also Cohen, supra note 176, at 657 ("Giving copyright owners too
little control may inhibit the creation of works by denying those owners the economic
rewards needed to stimulate creation .... ).
179. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY 6 (1994) (stating that decisions
surrounding copyright law, "whether made in the courts, legislatures, or private law
offices, have a single result: when copyright gives control to one person, it extracts some
measure of freedom to imitate from everyone else"); Cohen, supra note 176, at 657 ("Both
courts and commentators have struggled to define the best approach to use in balancing
the rights of copyright owners with the rights of derivative users in order to best serve the
public interest in creation of and access to original works of authorship.").
180. Lemley, supra note 30, at 992, 1013-29, 1073-83. Lemley states that "[c]urrent
copyright doctrine effectively assigns the rights in unlicensed improvements made by third
parties to original creators, by denying the improver copyright protection in his original
expression and declaring any creation of such derivative works to be infringement." Id. at
1074; see also 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000) ("The subject matter of a copyright... includes...
derivative works, but protection for a work employing preexisting material in which
copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such material has been
used unlawfully.").
181. See Lemley, supra note 30, at 1019-29.
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[protection] on the improvement," thus their works fail to rise to the
level of a derivative work. 182 Minor improvers likely would infringe the
underlying work and, thus, their work would fall exclusively under the
protection of the original copyright."3 For example, an arrangement that
does not contain enough originality to qualify as a separate copyrightable
derivative work would constitute a minor improvement under Lemley's
proposal." 4
Significant improvers contribute original, creative expression to a
copyrighted work, and, therefore, such contribution would typically
qualify as a derivative work .' Lemley notes the difficulty of situations
where a significant improvement is "inextricably intertwined" with the
underlying material, thus precluding copyright and limiting the
contribution. 1 6 Lemley concludes, therefore, that copyright law provides
insufficient encouragement for significant improvements and effectively
"allow[s] the original copyright owner to capture the value of...
significant improvements made by others.', 87 Significantly, many jazz
arrangements fall into this category9
Radical improvers make a major contribution to an original work such
that the additional material "predominates over infringing material.'
189
Without permission for use, radical improvers under copyright law could
still infringe the material utilized from the original work, regardless of
the value added.'9 Lemley claims that to determine whether animprovement is radical, a court should "not compare it to the whole of
182. Id. at 1019.
183. Id. at 1020.
184. Id.; see also supra Part I.A.2.
185. Lemley, supra note 30, at 1020.
186. See id. at 1022 (suggesting that Section 103 of the 1976 Copyright Act does not
provide sufficient protection for an improver's contributions unless the improver's
contribution is not "easily separated" from the original material). Section 103 allows for
copyrighting of the additions to an original work in derivative works, but the author of a
derivative work can copyright only those portions separable from the original work. Id. at
1021-22. This certainly reflects a difficult situation in many jazz arrangements, as melodic,
harmonic, and rhythmic elements can prove difficult to separate. See, e.g., supra notes 13-
15 and accompanying text.
187. Lemley, supra note 30, at 1022-23.
188. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
189. Lemley, supra note 30, at 1023.
190. See id. at 1023-24 (citing as an example "[t]he composer who writes a song which
is similar in only a few notes to a previously published song [is] subject to suit for
copyright infringement notwithstanding the value of [his] contributions" (footnote
omitted)).
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the original work," but only to the portion it draws from, which would
provide substantial protection to more creative arrangements. 91
Lemley dismisses the current rule and instead suggests a rule parallel
to the "blocking patents" doctrine that would protect "substantial
improvers"-such as significant and radical improvers (but excluding
minor improvers)-who contribute significantly to preexisting works.
92
Though it would not necessarily prevent infringement suits, this rule
would enhance the bargaining power of substantial improvers against the
creators of underlying works.'93
Lemley's proposed approach to derivative works takes into account
factors that present difficulties for jazz arrangements.' 94 Because courts
exact only one minimum threshold for an arrangement to qualify as a
copyrightable derivative work, the various levels of creativity existing in
jazz arrangements do not receive appropriate legal recognition. 95 An
adjustment in the law to recognize different categories of derivative
works and musical arrangements would undeniably represent an
improvement.
III. ESTABLISHING A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING JAZZ
ARRANGEMENTS
A. Woods v. Bourne Co.: An Appropriate Threshold for Minimum
Originality in Musical Arrangements
To effectively address whether arrangements contain sufficient
originality, courts should adopt a standard that incorporates the factors
announced by the Second Circuit in Woods v. Bourne Co. 196 By looking
191. Id. at 1083. Lemley defines improvement as "the new material produced by the
'improver,"' not a "value judgment about the relative merit of the two copyrighted
works." Id.
192. Id. at 1074. The "blocking patents" doctrine not only prevents the improver from
using the original patent's material without permission, but also prevents the original
patent holder from using the improver's added material. Id. at 1020-21.
193. See id. at 1075 (providing two rationales for this theory). First, when improvers
create valuable improvements, they would have more leverage to use against original
creators who wish to profit from the improved work; and second, it reduces the potential
for lawsuits by limiting the potential rewards for original creators. Id. at 1075-77. Lemley
also proposes a broad scope of protection for radical improvements based on the
"transformative use" doctrine, suggesting that courts should allow "a use in circumstances
where it adds a great deal of value" to an existing work in relation to the copied portion.
Id. at 1077-78.
194. See id. at 1074-77; supra note 30 and accompanying text.
195. See supra Part I.A.
196. 60 F.3d 978, 991 (2d Cir. 1995). The court adopted the district court's proposal
and provided a more defined framework of relevant factors and nonqualifying
contributions that courts should evaluate when looking to originality in musical
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to elements such as "unusual altered harmonies [and] novel sequential
uses of themes," courts will find that most jazz arrangements possess
sufficient originality to qualify as derivative works. 97
Though courts may differ as to the standard to apply, all agree that at
least some minimum standard of originality must exist for a musical
arrangement to qualify as a copyrightable derivative work.' 98  While
having a minimal threshold makes sense, copyright law stops there,
failing to account for the fact that jazz arrangements can vary greatly in
originality and in their use of underlying works.' 99 The single threshold
standard does not provide a suitable framework for copyrighting
derivative works. A better scheme would allow for different amounts of
protection to account for varying degrees of creativity and originality
evinced in those works.
B. Assessing Substantial Similarity in Jazz Arrangements
Due to the shortcomings of a single threshold approach, trouble could
arise in the event that an arranger deems her arrangement of such
considerable originality that she obtains a copyright for it as an original,
not derivative, work.2°° Because arrangers can dramatically alter an
underlying work in numerous ways, courts would have to examine all
elements of the arrangement as a whole to determine whether substantial
similarity exists.2 ' Additionally, because arrangers sometimes
incorporate small portions of previous works into their arrangements,2 2
arrangements. See id. Though the court did not explicitly present a minimum
requirement for sufficient originality in a copyrighted arrangement, it implied that a
musical arrangement must meet a certain standard in order to qualify for a copyright as a
derivative work. See id.
197. Woods v. Bourne Co., 841 F. Supp. 118, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 60 F.3d 978 (2d Cir. 1995).
198. See supra Part I.A.
199. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
200. See Email from Fred Sturm, supra note 17.
201. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text. As at least one court has
recognized, music in the jazz idiom often involves more creative musical ideas than those
recognized as traditional or popular. See Tempo Music, Inc. v. Famous Music Corp., 838
F. Supp. 162, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("[11n contemporary music, and particularly in the jazz
music genre, musicians frequently move beyond traditional rules to create a range of
dissonant and innovative sounds."). While the melody often presents the most obvious
starting point for analysis, not all courts have so constrained their examinations. See, e.g.,
id. at 169 ("[H]armony can, as a matter of law, be the subject of copyright."). By
evaluating elements other than the melody, such as harmony, courts could develop a
framework by which to resolve infringement disputes involving jazz arrangements.
202. See, e.g., STURM, supra note 4, at 15, 20 (describing how arranger Bob
Brookmeyer took several short melodic cells from Jelly "Roll" Morton's "King Porter
Stomp," and manipulated them into entirely new sequences to create a melodic structure
and "concluding gesture to his work"). Jazz arrangers often make use of significant
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courts should follow the approach in Newton that tests both the
quantitative and qualitative importance of the segment.203
C. An Expanded Approach to Derivative Works: Accounting for
Improvements in Copyright Law
Copyright law could more effectively solve the aforementioned
problem and eliminate the potential of infringement lawsuits by adjusting
the derivative works doctrine. Two critical problems plague the
copyrighting of jazz arrangements: the difficulty that can arise in
differentiating certain derivative works from their underlying works,'
4
and the inevitable intertwining of derivative works and their underlying
works .2 0  The former can give rise to infringement suits, and the latter
can reduce the amount of copyright protection available to a derivative
work.2° Creative jazz arrangements provide examples of both problems.
A clearer approach to copyright improvements would provide the best
opportunity for jazz arrangers to reap the rewards of their labor while
protecting the rights of composers of underlying original works.0 7 Under
an expanded improvements doctrine framework, treatment of derivative
works can advance beyond copyright law's single-threshold system of
certifying musical arrangements and allow for greater ownership and
protection.
themes from previous works. See, e.g., id. at 9 (discussing the numerous arrangements of
Billy Strayhorn's composition, and Ellington Orchestra theme, "Take the 'A' Train").
Most jazz fans and musicians would recognize this work immediately. See SAN JOSE JAZZ
SOC'Y, HIP TO JAZZ 2, http://sanjosejazz.org/images/education/hiptojazzbook.pdf (last
visited Apr. 20, 2006) ("Take the 'A' Train is one of the most famous and recognizable
tunes in jazz history."); D.C. Culberson, In the Swing, BALT. CITY PAPER, Oct. 20, 1999,
http://www.citypaper.com/arts/story.asp?id=4119 (referring to "Take the 'A' Train" as an
"instantly recognizable classic[]").
203. See Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S.
Ct. 2905 (2005) ("Substantiality is measured by considering the qualitative and
quantitative significance of the copied portion in relation to the plaintiff's work as a
whole."). As the court stated in Baxter v. MCA, Inc., despite the short length of a copied
portion, if qualitatively important, it can still lead to a finding of substantial similarity. See
Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1987).
204. See Goldstein, supra note 172, at 217; see also STURM, supra note 4, at 26-27
(describing Bill Holman's 1994 arrangement of "Chant of the Weed," in which the
Holman's melodic and rhythmic additions effectively "blurr[ed] the boundaries between
the original composition and the arrangement").
205. Lemley, supra note 30, at 1022.
206. See Goldstein, supra note 172, at 218 ("Having determined that a derivative right
is in issue, it is far more difficult and consequential to draw the line that separates
infringing from non-infringing derivative uses.").
207. See supra notes 180-93 and accompanying text.
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Many arrangers take original works and extensively revitalize those
works.3 8 These arrangements would qualify as significant or radical
improvements depending on their originality.2 9 Because the resulting
value of those arrangements rests largely in the hands of the arranger, it
hardly seems reasonable for the law to apportion strong ownership rights
to the underlying work if a subsequent derivative work proves vastly• 210
more expansive. Moreover, expanding the scope of derivative works
protection would actually serve to protect the rights of underlying
composers insofar as it would encourage arrangers to copyright their
works as derivative works, and not independent original works."'
By implementing a "blocking copyrights" doctrine for creative
derivative works, copyright law would strengthen arrangers' bargaining
212power. This more flexible doctrine would provide greater protection
for jazz arrangers while allowing composers of underlying works to retain
appropriate rights in the arrangement.2"3
D. An Expert-Driven "Intended Audience" Test: One in the Same for this
Field
To determine the copyright issues surrounding jazz arrangements,
courts should apply the "intended audience" test, as formulated in
214Dawson. Dawson addressed the quandary presented by courts'interpretations of Arnstein."5  The "intended audience" standard
208. See Email from Fred Sturm, supra note 17.
209. See supra notes 185-93 and accompanying text.
210. See Ronald P. Smith, Note, Arrangements and Editions of Public Domain Music:
Originality in a Finite System, 34 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 104, 139 (1983) ("Courts should
tailor the scope of protection to the extent of a work's originality."). For an extreme
example, "hummers," who often have little to no technical music skills, linger on movie
sets and hum melodies to a composer or arranger, hoping that the composer or arranger
might eventually develop one of their themes into an extensive movie orchestration.
Email from Fred Sturm, supra note 17; see also Eddie Glenn, Film Composer Shares His
Experience, SAPULPA DAILY HERALD (Sapulpa, Okla.), Oct. 14, 2005, http://www.sapulpa
dailyherald.com/statenews/cnhinsall-story-287085420.html (referencing "hummers" on
movie sets).
211. See supra notes 185-91 and accompanying text (recognizing the need to evaluate
not only new contributions in derivative works, but also what was utilized from underlying
works).
212. See Lemley, supra note 30, at 1075-77.
213. See Smith, supra note 210, at 139. Smith's goal of equating protection to
originality proves analogous to the goal of preserving public domain music, while also
recognizing the originality of composers who develop arrangements built from those
public domain works. See id. at 141.
214. Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731,736 (4th Cir. 1990).
215. See E. Scott Fruehwald, Copyright Infringement of Musical Compositions: A
Systematic Approach, 26 AKRON L. REV. 15, 27 (1992) ("[T]hose courts that employ the
ordinary listener test to establish copying ignore that the ordinary listener is ill-equipped
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provides a sensible alternative to the "lay listener" standard for courts to
utilize and may serve to better protect composers.1 6 Because the
audience for jazz arrangements generally consists of those interested ini" . 217
that particular art and not the average listener, no justification exists
for exacting the lesser standard when dealing with complex art forms. 8
Thus, a lay listener standard would prove woefully inadequate, given that• . 219
many lay listeners would have no experience with such jazz works.
to hear copying. They also confuse the purpose of the first prong of the Arnstein test.");
see also, e.g., Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 424 n.2 (9th Cir. 1987) ("[T]he test of
substantial similarity depends upon the response of the ordinary lay listener.").
216. See Baxa & Krasilovsky, supra note 158, at 101. An audience test proves superior
to an average lay observer standard because of "the intimate link between the
determination of substantial similarity and the basic economic philosophy underlying
copyright law." Michael Ferdinand Sitzer, Note, Copyright Infringement Actions: The
Proper Role for Audience Reactions in Determining Substantial Similarity, 54 S. CAL. L.
REV. 385, 416 (1981). Sitzer cautions, however, that "[c]ourts applying the audience test
on the issue of substantial similarity should take care to isolate the appropriate audience,"
because a plaintiff's audience can cover a different market than a defendant's audience.
Id. at 415-16.
217. Though not all situations present difficult questions of similarity, music's
increasingly broad landscape lessens the chances that the lay public will always constitute
the intended audience of a work. Cf Grinvalsky, supra note 33, at 423.
218. See id. Grinvalsky states that:
[an unintended audience may find that ... two works sound substantially
alike where an intended audience may find the two works fall short of substantial
similarity. Where the styles are similar, for example, an unintended audience
creates a risk of a lower substantial similarity plane. On the other hand, where
the styles are different, the risk shifts in the other direction. The result may be a
finding of no infringement where there perhaps should be, where the unintended
audience simply could not believe that the works contained similarity of
expression because, based on a mechanical change of tempo or instrumentation,
the works did not sound alike. Of course, this skewing will not always occur.
But having an unaided, uninformed, disinterested or distanced finder of fact
creates a potential risk of error that should not be there.
Id. Additionally, Michael Sitzer claims that "if the courts begin to question the true
rationale behind the use of spectator reactions, they will discover that the average lay
observer test is obsolete when dealing with works aimed at a distinguishable audience
group." Sitzer, supra note 216, at 415 (footnote omitted); see also J. Michael Keyes,
Musical Musings: The Case for Rethinking Music Copyright Protection, 10 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 407, 440 (2004) ("Music is not composed in a vacuum, and
it certainly is not composed for the ears of a hypothetical reasonable listener." (footnote
omitted)). In fact, jazz arranging provides a perfect example of the reason for the Dawson
court's standard. In Dawson, a spiritual arranger created work within a specialized niche
for those who held a special interest in that genre. Baxa & Krasilovsky, supra note 158, at
91-92. Therefore, it seems most probable that if confronted with a similar complex and
unique musical art form such as jazz arrangements, the court would have applied the same
standard.
219. See Baxa & Krasilovsky, supra note 158, at 100 (arguing that analysis by an
"ordinary lay person" should not apply "to sophisticated works such as choral sheet
music"); Alice J. Kim, Comment, Expert Testimony and Substantial Similarity: Facing the
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Likewise, when dealing with complex music copyright claims, courts
should always utilize expert testimony22 ° for, in the case of jazz
arrangements, the intended audience often consists of many who courts
would consider experts. It therefore makes sense to require courts to
"consider opinion testimony from qualified witnesses having specialized
knowledge of the field to assist the trier of fact in order to understand the
works and the likely reaction of the intended audience. 2 22  Arnstein
established that courts may examine expert testimony when necessary to
assist fact-finders; by this logic, expert testimony would likely prove
223relevant to infringement claims involving complex works. Expert
testimony can assist a court in evaluating jazz arrangements under the
intended audience standard; consequently, lessening the burden on the
224court to render a decision based on its own knowledge.
An expert-driven intended audience standard would serve to protect
both jazz arrangers and composers of original works. 2' The standardwould protect the rights of original composers by helping to identify
Music in (Music) Copyright Infringement Cases, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 109, 127
(1995) (noting that "'judges and juries are rarely musically educated and are less sensitive
to the intricacies involved in musical creativity,"' and emphasizing "the complexity of
music and the general public's unfamiliarity with the many technical aspects of music"
(quoting Debra Presti Brent, The Successful Music Copyright Infringement Suit: The
Impossible Dream, 7 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 229, 246 (1990)).
220. See Smith, supra note 210, at 139 ("The use of experts is essential to achieving an
informed analysis in an infringement suit .... Their judgment of the substantiality of
similarity between two arrangements can have a great impact on the ultimate success of a
particular arrangement .... ).
221. Cf. Baxa & Krasilovsky, supra note 158, at 100 (discussing the same idea in
relation to choral arrangements, that "[t]he intended audience for such a choral piece is
not the listening audience, nor even the average member of a chorus which might sing the
work; but rather, a choral director, teacher or other trained professional in the field").
222. Id. Additionally, even in less complex jazz arrangements, the necessity to parse
through a score containing multiple parts and systems of musical organization requires
musical training. Cf id. (asserting that this is true in complex choral arrangements).
223. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
224. Baxa & Krasilovsky, supra note 158, at 100. Paul Grinvalsky describes the
problem as "a judge, sitting at bar, holding two pieces of sheet music, simply could not
understand their language, and so was incapable of detecting, much less appreciating, their
similarity or dissimilarity." Grinvalsky, supra note 33, at 428. Grinvalsky also referred to
Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc. and the fact that the judge was not "'the audience for
whom such ... music [was] composed."' Id. (alterations in original); see also Keyes, supra
note 218, at 441 ("[lIt [does not] make sense for music copyright infringement to turn on
the ultimate reaction of a hypothetical listener whose auditory predilections are not at all
clear or even objectively defined."). For an even more expansive view of the role of
experts in music copyright infringement cases, see Smith, supra note 210, at 140-41
(discussing the possibility of an expert jury of knowledgeable musicians, whose
"familiarity with musical terminology and knowledge of the novelty and sophistication of
various musical techniques can [provide] well-reasoned, competent decisions").
225. See supra notes 216-24 and accompanying text.
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when extensively altered works infringe their compositions, and it would




Copyright law should promote, not inhibit, creativity in the arts. By
limiting incentives to create complex arrangements and, in some cases
denying privileges to elaborations on existing works, copyright law
provides insufficient protection for jazz arrangers. Courts should adopt a
derivative works scheme that accounts for the various levels of
improvements within copyright law. Expert testimony should provide
the basis for an "intended audience" standard that would best assist
courts in assessing originality in jazz arrangements. As a result,
composers of original works would retain rights in their works while
allowing jazz arrangers to develop new ideas freely based on those
underlying works thus, enriching the landscape of music.
226. See supra notes 222-24 and accompanying text.
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